PA103
The Biblical Worldview [Bertrand Russell as example] (Part I-VII:8; Aug., 1991) (Available in the book: Always Ready PA600)
© Covenant Media Foundation, 800/553-3938
Apologetics in Practice (Part 1)
By Dr. Greg Bahnsen
Under Attack
It is time to provide a concrete illustration or
practical application of the principles and tools for defending the Christian
faith which have been discussed in our previous studies. Training manuals on
fire-fighting do not put out fires; the actual fighting of fires does. And when
all is said and done, it is not the theory of apologetics which
defends the faith and stops the mouths of critics. Only the practice
of apologetics can do that.
Review
Let's summarize what has been said up to this
point about how to approach the task of apologetics.
1. Engaging in
apologetics is a moral necessity for every believer; we must be "always
ready" to offer an answer for the hope within us (1 Peter 3:15).
2. To avoid
misconceptions, we note that apologetics is not:
(a) pugnacious
(b) a matter of persuasion, or
(c) based on a different ultimate authority than theology.
3. For the
Christian, "reason" should be used as a tool, not as the ultimate
authority, in our thinking.
4. Our claim
before the world is that believers "know" the Bible to be true -- we
have adequate justification for believing its claims.
5. The
conflict between believers and unbelievers is ultimately over their differing
worldviews -- networks of presuppositions in terms of which all experience is
interpreted and reasoning is guided.
6.
Consequently we need to argue from "the impossibility of the
contrary," showing that only Christianity provides the preconditions of
intelligibility for man's experience and reasoning. If Christianity were not
true, the unbeliever could not prove or understand anything.
7. Unbelievers
are self-deceived: they know the truth about God, but suppress it
(rationalizing the clear evidence within them and all around them).
8. The true
defendant, intellectually and morally, is the unbeliever -- not God.
9. There are a
large variety of different kinds of attacks upon Christianity, and they cannot
be dealt with adequately by defenses which rest upon:
(a) subjectivism
(b) relativism, or
(c) eclecticism.
10. Apologists
must use argumentation. Sanctified argumentation need not be contentious; we
find that sanctified arguing with unbelievers is warranted by Biblical example.
11. An
argument asserts the truth of a proposition on the basis of others.
12.
Rationality in argumentation is broader than simply using the rules of
syllogistic deduction.
13. God wishes
for us to master the tools of rationality in defending the faith. It is our
task to refute the challenges of unbelievers and to offer an internal critique
of the position from which those challenges arise.
14. The two
key intellectual sins which are committed by people are
(a) inconsistency, and
(b) arbitrariness.
15. In dealing
with the unbeliever, the Christian should be alert to point out the critic's:
(a) prejudicial conjectures
(b) unargued philosophical bias
(c) presuppositions which do not comport with each other
(d) logical fallacies, and
(e) behavior which betrays his professed beliefs.
Looking for a Fire to Fight
It would be instructive and helpful for readers
if we could take the approach to apologetics which is advanced above and put it
to use in a concrete case. We need a fire to put out, following the guidelines
of our preceding fire-fighting manual.
An excellent opportunity to practice our defense
of the Christian faith is provided by one of the most noteworthy British
philosophers of the twentieth century: Bertrand Russell. Russell has offered us
a clear and pointed example of an intellectual challenge to the truthfulness of
the Christian faith by writing an article which specifically aimed to show that
Christianity should not be believed. The title of his famous essay was
"Why I Am Not a Christian."[1] Bertrand Russell
(1872-1970) studied mathematics and philosophy at Cambridge University and began
his teaching career there. He wrote respected works as a philosopher (about
Leibniz, about the philosophy of mathematics and set theory, about the
metaphysics of mind and matter, about epistemological problems) and was
influential on twentieth-century developments in the philosophy of language. He
also wrote extensively in a more popular vein on literature, education and
politics. Controversy surrounded him. He was dismissed by Trinity College for
pacifist activities in 1916; he was jailed in 1961 in connection with a
campaign for nuclear disarmament. His views on sexual morality contributed to
the annulment of his appointment to teach at the City University of New York in
1940. Yet Russell was highly regarded as a scholar. In 1944 he returned to
teach at Cambridge, and in 1950 he became a recipient of the Nobel Prize for
Literature.
For all his stature as a philosopher, Russell
cannot be said to have been sure of himself and consistent in his views
regarding reality or knowledge. In his early years he adopted the Hegelian
idealism taught by F. H. Bradley. Influenced by G. E. Moore, he changed to a
Platonic theory of ideas. Challenged by Ludwig Wittgenstein that mathematics
consists merely of tautologies, he turned to metaphysical and linguistic
atomism. He adopted the extreme realism of Alexius Meinong, only later to turn
toward logical constructionism instead. Then following the lead of William
James, Russell abandoned mind-matter dualism for the theory of neutral monism.
Eventually Russell propounded materialism with fervor, even though his
dissatisfaction with his earlier logical atomism left him without an
alternative metaphysical account of the object of our empirical experiences.
Struggling with philosophical problems not unlike those which stymied David
Hume, Russell conceded in his later years that the quest for certainty is a
failure.
This brief history of Russell's philosophical
evolution is rehearsed so that the reader may correctly appraise the strength
and authority of the intellectual platform from which Russell would presume to
criticize the Christian faith. Russell's brilliance is not in doubt; he was a
talented and intelligent man. But to what avail? In criticizing Christians for
their views of ultimate reality, of how we know what we know, and of how we
should live our lives, did Bertrand Russell have a defensible alternative from
which to launch his attacks? Not at all. He could not give an account of
reality and knowing which -- on the grounds of, and according to the criteria
of, his own autonomous reasoning -- was cogent, reasonable and sure. He could
not say with certainty what was true about reality and knowledge, but
nevertheless he was firmly convinced that Christianity was false! Russell was
firing an unloaded gun.
Bertrand Russell made no secret of the fact that
he intellectually and personally disdained religion in general, and
Christianity in particular. In the preface to the book of his critical essays
on the subject of religion he wrote: "I am as firmly convinced that religions
do harm as I am that they are untrue."[2] He repeatedly
charges in one way or another that a free man who exercises his reasoning
ability cannot submit to religious dogma. He argued that religion was a
hindrance to the advance of civilization, that it cannot cure our troubles, and
that we do not survive death.
We are treated to a defiant expression of
metaphysical materialism -- perhaps Russell's most notorious essay for a
popular reading audience -- in the article (first published in 1903) entitled
"A Free Man's Worship." He there concluded: "Brief and powerless
is man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and
dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls
on its relentless way." In the face of this nihilism and ethical
subjectivism, Russell nevertheless called men to the invigoration of the free
man's worship: "to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built;
undismayed by the empire of chance...."[3]
Hopefully the brazen contradiction in Russell's
philosophy of life is already apparent to the reader. He asserts that our
ideals and values are not objective and supported by the nature of reality,
indeed that they are fleeting and doomed to destruction. On the other hand,
quite contrary to this, Russell encourages us to assert our autonomous values
in the face of a valueless universe -- to act as though they really amounted to
something worthwhile, were rational, and not merely the result of chance. But
after all, what sense could Russell hope to make of an immaterial value
(an ideal) in the face of an "omnipotent matter" which is blind to
values? Russell only succeeded in shooting himself in the foot.
Why Russell Said He Could Not Be a Christian
The essay "Why I Am Not a Christian" is
the text of a lecture which Russell delivered to the National Secular Society
in London on March 6, 1927. It is only fair to recognize, as Russell commented,
that constraints of time prevented him from going into great detail or saying
as much as he might like about the matters which he raises in the lecture.
Nevertheless, he says quite enough with which to find fault.
In broad terms, Russell argued that he could not
be a Christian because:
(1) the Roman
Catholic church is mistaken to say that the existence of God can be proved by
unaided reason;
(2) serious
defects in the character and teaching of Jesus show that he was not the best
and wisest of men, but actually morally inferior to Buddha and Socrates;
(3) people
accept religion on emotional grounds, particularly on the foundation of fear,
which is "not worthy of self-respecting human beings"; and
(4) the
Christian religion "has been and still is the principal enemy of moral
progress in the world."
Internal Tensions
What is outstanding about this litany of
complaints against Christianity is Russell's arbitrariness and inconsistency.
The second reason offered above presupposes some absolute standard of moral
wisdom by which somebody could grade Jesus as either inferior or superior to
others. Likewise, the third reason presupposes a fixed criterion for what is,
and what is not, "worthy" of self-respecting human beings. Then
again, the complaint expressed in the fourth reason would not make any sense
unless it is objectively wrong to be an enemy of "moral progress";
indeed, the very notion of moral "progress" itself assumes an
established benchmark for morality by which to assess progress.
Now, if Russell had been reasoning and speaking
in terms of the Christian worldview, his attempt to assess moral wisdom, human
worthiness, and moral progress -- as well as to adversely judge shortcomings in
these matters -- would be understandable and expected. Christians have a
universal, objective and absolute standard of morality in the revealed word of
God. But obviously Russell did not mean to be speaking as though he adopted
Christian premises and perspectives! On what basis, then, could Russell issue
his moral evaluations and judgments? In terms of what view of reality and
knowledge did he assume that there was anything like an objective criterion of
morality by which to find Christ, Christians, and the church lacking?
Russell was embarrassingly arbitrary in this
regard. He just took it for granted, as an unargued philosophical bias, that
there was a moral standard to apply, and that he could presume to be the
spokesman and judge who applies it. One could easily counter Russell by simply
saying that he had arbitrarily chosen the wrong standard of morality. To be
fair, Russell's opponents must be granted just as much arbitrariness in
choosing a moral standard, and they may then select one different from his own.
And there goes his argument down in defeat.
[1] The article is found in
Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian, And Other Essays on Religion
and Related Subjects, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Simon and Schuster,
Clarion, 1957), pp. 3-23.
[2] Ibid., p. vi.
[3] Ibid., pp. 115-16.
PA103
The Biblical Worldview [Bertrand Russell as example] (Part II-VII:9;
Sept., 1991) (Available in the book: Always Ready PA600)
©
Covenant Media Foundation, 800/553-3938
Apologetics
in Practice (Part 2)
By Dr. Greg
Bahnsen
By assuming the prerogative to pass moral
judgment, Russell evidenced that his own presuppositions fail to comport with
each other. In offering a condemning value-judgment against Christianity,
Russell engaged in behavior which betrayed his professed beliefs elsewhere. In
his lecture Russell professed that this was a chance world which shows no
evidence of design, and where "laws" are nothing more than
statistical averages describing what has happened. He professed that the
physical world may have always existed, and that human life and intelligence
came about in the way explained by Darwin (evolutionary natural selection). Our
values and hopes are what "our intelligence can create." The fact
remains that, according to "the ordinary laws of science, you have to
suppose that human life... on this planet will die out in due course."
This is simply to say that human values are
subjective, fleeting, and self-created. In short, they are relative. Holding to
this kind of view of moral values, Russell was utterly inconsistent in acting
as though he could assume an altogether different kind of view of values,
declaring an absolute moral evaluation of Christ or Christians. One aspect of
Russell's network of beliefs rendered another aspect of his set of beliefs
unintelligible.
The same kind of inner tension within Russell's
beliefs is evident above in what he had to say about the "laws" of
science. On the one hand such laws are merely descriptions of what has happened
in the past, says Russell. On the other hand, Russell spoke of the laws of
science as providing a basis for projecting what will happen in the future,
namely the decay of the solar system. This kind of dialectical dance between
conflicting views of scientific law (to speak epistemologically) or between
conflicting views of the nature of the physical cosmos (to speak
metaphysically) is characteristic of unbelieving thought. Such thinking is not
in harmony with itself and is thus irrational.
"Unaided Reason"
In the first reason given by Russell for why he
was not a Christian, he alluded to the dogma of the Roman Catholic church that
"the existence of God can be proved by the unaided reason."[1] He then turns to some of the more popular arguments
advanced for the existence of God which are (supposedly) based upon this
"unaided reason" and easily finds them wanting. It goes without
saying, of course, that Russell thought that he was defeating these arguments
of unaided reason by means of his own (superior) unaided reason. Russell did
not disagree with Rome that man can prove things with his "natural
reason" (apart from the supernatural work of grace). Indeed at the end of
his lecture he called his hearers to "a fearless outlook and a free
intelligence." Russell simply disagreed that unaided reason takes one to
God. In different ways, and with different final conclusions, both the Roman
church and Russell encouraged men to exercise their reasoning ability
autonomously -- apart from the foundation and restraints of divine revelation.
The Christian apologist should not fail to expose
this commitment to "unaided reason" for the unargued
philosophical bias that it is. Throughout his lecture Russell simply takes it
for granted that autonomous reason enables man to know things. He speaks freely
of his "knowledge of what atoms actually do," of what "science
can teach us," and of "certain quite definite fallacies"
committed in Christian arguments, etc. But this simply will not do. As the
philosopher, Russell here gave himself a free ride; he hypocritically failed to
be as self-critical in his reasoning as he beseeched others to be with
themselves.
The nagging problem which Russell simply did not
face is that, on the basis of autonomous reasoning, man cannot give an adequate
and rational account of the knowledge we gain through science and logic.
Scientific procedure assumes that the natural world operates in a uniform
fashion, in which case our observational knowledge of past cases provides a
basis for predicting what will happen in future cases. However, autonomous
reason has no basis whatsoever for believing that the natural world will
operate in a uniform fashion. Russell himself (at times) asserted that this is
a chance universe. He could never reconcile this view of nature being random
with his view that nature is uniform (so that "science" can teach
us).
So it is with a knowledge and use of the laws of
logic (in terms of which Russell definitely insisted that fallacies be
avoided). The laws of logic are not physical objects in the natural world; they
are not observed by man's senses. Moreover, the laws of logic are universal and
unchanging -- or else they reduce to relativistic preferences for thinking,
rather than prescriptive requirements. However, Russell's autonomous reasoning
could not explain or justify these characteristics of logical laws. An
individual's unaided reason is limited in the scope of its use and experiences,
in which case it cannot pronounce on what is universally true (descriptively).
On the other hand, an individual's unaided reason is in no position to dictate
(prescriptively) universal laws of thought or to assure us that these
stipulations for the mind will somehow prove applicable to the world of thought
or matter outside the individual's mind.[2]
Russell's worldview, even apart from its internal
tensions, could not provide a foundation for the intelligibility of science or
logic. His "unaided" reason could not account for the knowledge which
men readily gain in God's universe, a universe sovereignly controlled (so that
it is uniform) and interpreted in light of the Creator's revealed mind (so that
there are immaterial laws of thought which are universal).
Prejudicial Conjecture and Logical Fallacies
We must note, finally, that Russell's case
against being a Christian is subject to criticism for its reliance upon
prejudicial conjecture and logical fallacies. That being the case, he cannot be
thought to have established his conclusions or given good reason for his
rejection of Christianity.
One stands in amazement, for instance, that the
same Russell who could lavish ridicule upon past Christians for their ignorance
and lack of scholarship, could come out and say something as uneducated and
inaccurate as this: "Historically it is quite doubtful whether Christ ever
existed at all, and if He did we do not know anything about Him." Even
forgetting secular references to Christ in the ancient world, Russell's remark
simply ignores the documents of the New Testament as early and authentic
witnesses to the historical person of Jesus. Given the relatively early dates
of these documents and the relatively large number of them, if Russell
"doubted" the existence of Jesus Christ, he must have either applied
a conspicuous double standard in his historical reasoning, or been an agnostic
about virtually the whole of ancient history. Either way, we are given an
insight into the prejudicial nature of Russell's thinking when it came to
consideration of the Christian religion.
Perhaps the most obvious logical fallacy evident
in Russell's lecture comes out in the way he readily shifts from an evaluation
of Christian beliefs to a criticism of Christian believers. And he should have
known better. At the very beginning of his lecture, Russell said, "I do
not mean by a Christian any person who tries to live decently and according to
his lights. I think that you must have a certain amount of definite belief
before you have a right to call yourself a Christian." That is, the object
of Russell's criticism should be, by his own testimony, not the lifestyle of
individuals but the doctrinal claims which are essential to Christianity as a system
of thought. The opening of his lecture focuses upon his dissatisfaction with
those beliefs (God's existence, immortality, Christ as the best of men).
Nevertheless, toward the end of his lecture,
Russell's discussion turns in the direction of fallaciously arguing against the
personal defects of Christians (enforcing narrow rules contrary to human
happiness) and the supposed psychological genesis of their beliefs (in emotion
and fear). That is, he indulges in the fallacy of arguing ad hominem.
Even if what Russell had to say in these matters was fair-minded and accurate
(it is not), the fact would remain that Russell has descended to the level of
arguing against a truth-claim on the basis of his personal dislike and
psychologizing of those who personally profess that claim. In other settings,
Russell the philosopher would have been the first to criticize a student for
pulling such a thing. It is nothing less than a shameful logical fallacy.
Notice briefly other defects in Russell's line of
thinking here. He presumed to know the motivation of a person in becoming a
Christian -- even though Russell's epistemology gave him no warrant for
thinking he could discern such things (especially easily and at a distance).
Moreover, he presumed to know the motivation of a whole class of people
(including those who lived long ago), based on a very, very small sampling from
his own present experience. These are little more than hasty and unfounded
generalizations, telling us (if anything) only about the state of Russell's
mind and feelings in his obvious, emotional antipathy to Christians.
But then this leaves us face to face with a
final, devastating fallacy in Russell's case against Christianity -- the use of
double standards (and implicit special pleading) in his reasoning. Russell
wished to fault Christians for the emotional factor in their faith-commitment,
and yet Russell himself evidenced a similarly emotional factor in his own
personal anti-Christian commitment. Indeed, Russell openly appealed to
emotional feelings of courage, pride, freedom and self-worth as a basis for his
audience to refrain from being Christians!
Similarly, Russell tried to take Christians to
task for their "wickedness" (as though there could be any such thing
within Russell's worldview) -- for their cruelty, wars, inquisitions, etc.
Russell did not pause for even a moment, however, to reflect on the
far-surpassing cruelty and violence of non-Christians throughout history.
Genghis Khan, Vlad the Impaler, Marquis de Sade and a whole cast of other butchers
were not known in history for their Christian professions, after all! This is
all conveniently swept under the carpet in Russell's hypocritical disdain for
the moral errors of the Christian church.
Russell's essay "Why I Am Not a
Christian" reveals to us that even the intellectually elite of this world
are refuted by their own errors in opposing the truth of the Christian faith.
There is no credibility to a challenge to Christianity which evidences
prejudicial conjecture, logical fallacies, unargued philosophical bias,
behavior which betrays professed beliefs, and presuppositions which do not
comport with each other. Why wasn't Russell a Christian? Given his weak effort
at criticism, one would have to conclude that it was not for intellectual reasons.
[1] In his lecture Russell
displays a curious and capricious shifting around for the standard which
defines the content of "Christian" beliefs. Here he arbitrarily
assumes that what the Roman magisterium says is the standard of Christian
faith. Yet in the paragraph immediately preceding, Russell claimed that the
doctrine of hell was not essential to Christian belief because the Privy
Council of the English Parliament had so decreed (over the dissent of the
Archbishops of Canterbury and York). Elsewhere Russell departs from this
criterion of Christianity and excoriates the teaching of Jesus, based upon the
Bible, that the unrepentant face everlasting damnation. Russell had no interest
in being consistent or fair in dealing with Christianity as his opponent. When
convenient he defined the faith according to the Bible, but when it was more
convenient for his polemical purposes he shifted to defining the faith
according to the English Parliament or the Roman Catholic church.
[2] Those familiar with Russell's
detailed (and noteworthy, seminal) work in philosophy would point out that,
despite his brilliance, Russell's "unaided reason" could never
resolve certain semantic and logical paradoxes which arise in his account of
logic, mathematics and language. His most reverent followers concede that
Russell's theories are subject to criticism.
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